Juvenile Law by Dale, Michael J.
Nova Law Review
Volume 18, Issue 1 1993 Article 15
Juvenile Law
Michael J. Dale∗
∗
Copyright c©1993 by the authors. Nova Law Review is produced by The Berkeley Electronic
Press (bepress). http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr
Juvenile Law: 1993 Leading Cases and Significant
Developments in Florida Law
Michael J. Dale*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. INTRODUCTION . ........................... 541
11. DEPENDENCY ............................ 543
A. Trial Issues . .......................... 543
13. Appellate Issues ........................ 548
C. Child Abuse Reporting Issues ............. 551
Ill. DELINQUENCY ........................... 552
A. Detention Issues ...................... 552
B. Appellate Issues ........................ 554
C. Dispositional Issues . .................... 555
IV. FAMILIES AND CHILDREN IN NEED OF SERVICES ... 558
V. CONCLUSION . ............................ 559
I. INTRODUCTION
The Florida courts have recently made significant decisions on major
issues involving the rights of children. During the past year, the Kimberly
Mays' case in Sarasota and the Gregory K.2 case in Orlando generated
national interest.3 In the Mays case, the trial court ruled that the fourteen-
year-old youngster's natural parents, Ernest and Regina Twigg, could have
* Professor of Law, Nova University Shepard Broad Law Center; B.A., Colgate
University, 1967; J.D., Boston College Law School, 1970. The author thanks Elizabeth
Zsakany for her assistance in the preparation of this article. This article will cover cases
decided through September 30, 1993.
1. Twigg v. Mays, No. 88-4489-CA-01, 1993 WL 330624 (Fla. 12th Cir. Ct. Aug. 18,
1993).
2. Kingsley v. Kingsley, 623 So. 2d 780 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
3. See Ellen Goodman, The Changing Form-and Often Conflicting Views-of the
Family, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 19, 1993, at 19.
1
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no visitation with the child.4 An appeal is pending. In the Gregory K.
case, Florida's Fifth District Court of Appeal recently ruled on the
procedural question of the youngster's right to proceed on his own behalf
in a termination of parental rights case. While the court found that he could
not, it upheld the trial court's decision to terminate parental rights on other
grounds.5 The Gregory K. case is fully discussed later in this article.6
These cases follow on the heels of several Florida Supreme Court
decisions which demonstrate a pattern of attention to the rights of children.
The supreme court cases include: Padgett v. Department of Health &
Rehabilitative Services,7 which established the doctrine of prospective
neglect; A.A. v. Rolle,8 which limited the use of secure detention for
contempt; In re T W.,9 which supported a minor's right to privacy in an
abortion situation; and Hermanson v. State,' ° which upheld the defense of
religious practices against the charge of criminal child abuse.
The Florida appellate courts continued a tradition described in earlier
survey articles in which they manifested assiduous attention to careful
interpretation of Chapter 39 of the Florida Statutes (Florida's Juvenile
Code), and maintained a long standing policy of holding trial courts
accountable for strict compliance with the mandates of Chapter 39."
This survey reviews the major case law for the past year, focusing on
dependency, delinquency, and termination of parental rights cases, together
with a detailed discussion of the Gregory K. case.
4. Mays, 1993 WL 330624, at *6; see also Mays v. Twigg, 543 So. 2d 241 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1989). The trial court, on remand from the Second District Court of Appeal,
found that any forced visitation or contact between the Twiggs and Kimberly Mays would
be detrimental to Kimberly, and therefore the Twiggs had no legal interest in or right to visit
Kimberly Mays. Mays, 1993 WL 330624, at *6.
5. Kingsley, 623 So. 2d at 780.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 25-47.
7. 577 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1991).
8. 604 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 1992).
9. 551 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1989).
10. 604 So. 2d 775 (Fla. 1992).
11. See Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1992 Survey of Florida Law, 17 NOVA L. REV.
335 (1992); Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1991 Survey of Florida Law, 16 NOVA L. REV.
333 (1991); Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1990 Survey of Florida Law, 15 NOVA L. REV.
1169 (1991); Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law, 14 NOVA L. REV. 859 (1990); Michael J. Dale,
Survey of Florida Law: Juvenile Law, 13 NOVA L. REV. 1159 (1989).
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II. DEPENDENCY
A. Trial Issues
Issues of confidentiality in dependency proceedings, contrasting with
the public's right to know, continue to arise in proceedings in Florida. Last
year's Survey of Juvenile Law briefly discussed Department of Health &
Rehabilitative Services v. A.N.,' 2 a notorious case regularly covered by the
South Florida media.' 3 In A.N., the parents and the guardian ad litem of
A.N. agreed to allow the media full access to the dependency proceedings
and records. The Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services ("HRS")
appealed. The Third District Court of Appeal concluded that Florida law
does not prohibit a guardian ad litem from waiving the benefit of sections
39.411(3) and (4) of the Florida Statutes. 4 The appellate court thus found
that the circuit court was acting within its discretion when it decided that
disclosure would correct speculation, rumor, or innuendo about the family
that was the subject of the proceedings, as well as serve the best interests of
12. 604 So. 2d I I (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992); see also Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law:
1992 Survey of Florida Law, 17 NOVA L. REV. 335, 375 (1992).
13. See, e.g., Liz Balmaseda, It's Best to Settle Nogues Casefor Children's Sake, MIAMI
HERALD, May 16, 1992, at IB; Andres Viglucci, Dade Judge Recuses Himself From Tragic
Child-Abuse Case, MIAMI HERALD, July 18, 1992, at IB; Liz Balmaseda, Children Paying
Highest Price As Case Drags On, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 16, 1992, at IB; Liz Balmaseda, A
Mother's Unwavering Commitment, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 28, 1992, at I B.
14. A.N., 604 So. 2d at 11. Section 39.411(3) of the Florida Statutes provides in
relevant pan:
All court records required by this part shall not be open to inspection by the
public. All records shall be inspected only upon order of the court by persons
deemed by the court to have a proper interest therein, except that, subject to the
provisions of s. 63.162, a child and the parents or legal custodians of the child
and their attorneys, law enforcement agencies, and the department and its
designees shall always have the right to inspect and copy any official record
pertaining to the child.
FLA. STAT. § 39.411(3) (1991). Section 39.411(4) provides in relevant part:
All information obtained pursuant to this part in the discharge of official duty
by any judge, employee of the court, authorized agent of the department,
correctional probation officer, or law enforcement agent shall be confidential and
exempt from the provisions of s. 119.07(1) and shall not be disclosed to anyone
other than the authorized personnel of the court, the department and its
designees, correctional probation officers, law enforcement agents, and others
entitled under this chapter to receive the information, except upon order of the
court.
Id. § 39.411(4).
Dale
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the children at the same time."' As a result of this ruling, the case made
front page news throughout the spring and summer of 1993.6
A very different kind of confidentiality issue arose in Jett v. State.
17
The defendant argued on appeal in this criminal case that he was denied the
ability to question a psychotherapist and psychologist concerning their
communications with the child victims whom he allegedly assaulted. The
Fifth District Court of Appeal, sitting en banc, held that Florida Statutes
section 415.512, which governs waivers of privileged communications, is
available to an alleged perpetrator in a criminal case.'" The significance
of the waiver is that it not only applies in any situation involving known or
suspected child abuse or neglect (typically dependency proceedings), but
also in any judicial proceeding relating to child abuse or neglect.' 9 The
appellate court's view was expansive in this regard by including criminal
cases within the definition of judicial proceedings relating to child abuse and
neglect.20
The four dissenters argued that the section does not apply as extensive-
ly as the majority would allow. 2' At the heart of the difference between
the judges is the question of what particular effect an expansive waiver of
privilege will have. For example, Judge Sharp, in his dissent, commented
that children may not speak freely to therapists, resulting in the loss of
diagnosis and treatment, whereas child abusers and rapists will benefit from
the interpretation. 2 Not discussed in the opinion is the question of
balancing the child's right to privacy and to privileged communication with
medical providers against the criminal defendant's right to confrontation.
The issue of standing in termination of parental rights cases was the
subject of two recent appellate decisions. The first is the well-known
Gregory K. case which is actually entitled Kingsley v. Kingsley.23 The
15. A.N., 604 So. 2d at 11.
16. See, e.g., Liz Balmaseda, Child Advocates Became Enemy of the Family, MIAMI
HERALD, June 26, 1993, at IB; Liz Balmaseda, Nogues Case Kids Abused by the System,
MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 21, 1993, at I B; Andres Viglucci, Judge Sends Nogues Children Home
for Immediate Reunion, MIAMI HERALD, July 24, 1993, at I B; Andres Viglucci, Family Torn
by Allegations of Abuse Ordered Reunited, MIAMI HERALD, June 25, 1993, at IA.
17. 605 So. 2d 926 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992), approved, 1993 WL 458840 (Fla.
Nov. 10, 1993).
18. Id. at 928.
19. Id.
20. See id.
21. See id. at 929-33.
22. Jett, 605 So. 2d at 930 (Sharp, J., dissenting).
23. Kingsley, 623 So. 2d at 780.
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second case is In re C.G.2 4 In the Gregory K. case, the child appealed the
trial court's order denying the child's motion for summary judgment
regarding the applicable burden of proof.25 The mother of the child also
appealed, challenging the trial court's order that terminated her parental
rights and granted an adoption petition filed by the child's foster parents.
The case originated in June, 1992 when Gregory, then eleven years old,
filed a petition for termination of parental rights in the juvenile division of
the circuit court. His foster parents filed a separate complaint for declara-
tion of rights and adoption in the civil division of the circuit court. The
latter matter was transferred to the juvenile division. The trial court ruled
that Gregory had standing to initiate the action for termination of parental
rights. 26  Subsequent to the initial filings, which the trial court accepted,
the court appointed one of the child's attorneys as his attorney ad litem.27
Thereafter, the child's foster parents filed a petition for adoption. The foster
father, the guardian ad litem, HRS, and the foster mother filed four
additional petitions for termination of parental rights on the child's behalf.
The matter proceeded to trial in September, 1992. Over the mother's
objection, the trial court simultaneously tried the termination of parental
rights proceeding and the adoption proceeding. After the parties presented
their evidence, the trial court orally terminated parental rights and proceeded
immediately to grant the adoption petition, also from the bench.2 1 It
subsequently filed a nunc pro tunc written judgment.
The district court of appeal found first and emphatically that the child
lacked the capacity to bring a termination of parental rights case himself.29
Because Gregory was an unemancipated minor, he could not sue in his own
right pursuant to Rule 1.210(b) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure.3"
24. 612 So. 2d 602 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
25. Kingsley, 623 So. 2d at 782.
26. Id.
27. The trial court observed that the roles of guardian ad litem and attorney ad litem
were distinct. Id.
28. Id. at 783.
29. Id.
30. Kingsley, 623 So. 2d at 783. Rule 1.210(b) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure
provides:
Infants or Incompetent Persons. When an infant or incompetent person has a
representative, such as a guardian or other like fiduciary, the representative may
sue or defend on behalf of the infant or incompetent person. An infant or
incompetent person who does not have a duly appointed representative may sue
by next friend or by a guardian ad litem. The court shall appoint a guardian ad
litem fir an infant or incompetent person not otherwise represented in an action
or shall make such other order as it deems proper for the protection of the infant
Dale
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The court held that representation by counsel in and of itself was not
sufficient.31 Rather, a guardian ad litem or next friend must represent the
child." According to Florida state law, which tracks the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, a next friend can bring the suit with the minor as the real
party in interest.33
The appellate court recognized that within the dependency provisions
of Chapter 39, a number of persons can commence a dependency or
termination of parental rights proceeding.34 The court stated that an
attorney may commence the proceeding by filing the termination petition;
however, the attorney must do so as next friend of the child. The court
concluded that the error made below in allowing Gregory to bring a
termination of parental rights suit was procedural and not jurisdictional.35
Thus, the continuation of the proceedings through a next friend or guardian
ad litem rectified the trial court's error and rendered it harmless.36
Gregory and his foster father appealed, arguing that the burden of proof
should be by a preponderance of the evidence and not a clear and convinc-
ing standard. They argued that the child had a fundamental liberty interest
equal to that of the parent. Therefore, the standard of clear and convincing
evidence should not apply when the action is brought on behalf of the child.
The appellate court simply and expediently disposed of this incongruous
argument in light of the 1982 United States Supreme Court ruling in
Santosky v. Kramer,37 and held that the standard must be clear and
convincing evidence as a matter of procedural due process.38
or incompetent person.
FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.210(b).
31. Kingsley, 623 So. 2d at 784.
32. Id.
33. Id. The court defended the capacity to sue as being "the right to come into court
which exists if one is free of general disability, such as infancy or insanity." Id. at 783
(citing Earls v. King, 785 S.W.2d 741, 743 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990)); see also FED. R. Civ. P.
17(c).
34. Kingsley, 623 So. 2d at 784; see FLA. STAT. § 39.461(1) (Supp. 1992); see also
Lupinek v. Firth, 619 So. 2d 379 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that a child's
guardian ad litem has authority to file a petition to terminate parental rights).
35. Kingsley, 623 So. 2d at 785.
36. Id.
37. 455 U.S. 745 (1982). Among the problems with the child's (Gregory) argument is
that it fails to take into account the situation that arises when the child wishes to remain with
the parent and claims a protected liberty interest in staying with the natural parent. See, e.g.,
Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 846-47
(1977).
38. Kingsley, 623 So. 2d at 785.
[Vol. 18
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Finally, the court dealt with the natural mother's claim that the trial
court erred in trying the termination of parental rights and adoption cases
simultaneously, which violated her procedural due process rights. The court
agreed and reversed the trial court's decision.3 9 The appellate court relied
upon Rule 8.275(a) of the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure and section
39.473(3) of the Florida Statutes, both of which obviously contemplate
trying the matters separately.4" The appellate court recognized that trying
both matters together might cause "an impermissible comparison between
the natural parent's parenting skills and those of the prospective parents,"
which is violative of the natural parent's fundamental interest in the care and
custody of the child.4' However, because there was no emphasis on such
comparisons at the trial level, the appellate court held that the error was
harmless under the facts of the case. On the other hand, the appellate court
found that the trial court was without subject matter jurisdiction to grant the
foster parents' petition for adoption. According to the appellate court, this
was reversible error, and the matter was remanded for further proceed-
ings.42
Chief Judge Harris concurred in part and dissented in part. He found
the intermixing of the adoption proceeding with the termination case to be
reversible error.4 3 He reasoned that mixing the issue in the adoption case,
establishing the manifest best interests of the child,44 with the standard for
termination of parental rights unfairly prejudiced the mother because the
standard in the case at bar required that there be a finding of abandonment
before the best interests of the child were taken into account.45 In his
view, the trial strategy employed by the attorneys for the child caused the
39. Id.
40. Id. Rule 8.275(a) states:
Termination of Parental Rights. The taking of an appeal shall operate as a
supersedeas in cases involving a petition for termination of parental rights, but
the child shall continue in the custody of the agency under the order until the
appeal is decided.
FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.275(a). Section 39.473(3) of the Florida Statutes provides that:
[A] termination of parental rights order with placement of the child with a
licensed child-placing agency or the department for subsequent adoption shall
be suspended while the appeal is pending, but the child shall continue in custody
under the order until the appeal is decided.
FLA. STAT. § 39.473(3) (Supp. 1992).
41. Kingsley, 623 So. 2d at 788.
42. Id. at 789.
43. Id. at 792.
44. See FLA. STAT. § 39.467(2) (Supp. 1992).
45. Kingsley, 623 So. 2d at 790.
Dale
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trial court to fail to keep the two-step process separate. As Chief Judge
Harris stated, "[c]learly the adoption testimony was presented along with the
testimony relating to the termination proceedings when the only relevant
issue was whether the mother's conduct justified termination."46 He also
perceptively stated:
This rather ordinary termination of parental rights case was transformed
into a cause celebre by artful representation and the glare of klieg lights.
It is the judge's obligation, however, to look beyond the images created
by light and shadow and concentrate on the real-life drama being played
out on center stage. Florida recognizes no cause of action that permits
a child to divorce his parents.47
Contrasted with the notoriety of the Gregory K. case is In re C.G.,4"
another important opinion that deals with the issue of standing in the
dependency area. In C.G., the adoptive parents of a child wished to
intervene in a dependency proceeding involving the child's natural half sister
and to become the foster parents of the half sister. The Fourth District
Court of Appeal ruled that adoptive parents had standing to petition to
intervene in the dependency proceeding.49 The court held that the adoptive
parents of the half-sibling had standing to petition for modification of
placement under section 39.41(1)(a)7 of the Florida Statutes.5" The
appellate court read sections 39.41 and 30.45 of the Florida Statutes,
together with section 63.022(1) of the Florida Adoption Act, to conclude
that sibling groups should be kept together; thus, persons who have an
interest in causing that to occur should be able to intervene.5' By inter-
preting the various statutes in combination, the court found that the
Legislature had intended to allow such persons to participate in placement
proceedings.2
B. Appellate Issues
The Florida Supreme Court addressed two important issues of appellate
46. Id at 791.
47. Id. at 790.
48. 612 So. 2d 602 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
49. Id at 604.
50. Id. at 603.
51. Id.
52. Id.
[Vol. 18
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practice in dependency proceedings in late 1992. The question in In re
E.H.3 was whether a parent is entitled to a belated appeal in a termination
of parental rights case based upon the claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel for failure to timely file the notice of appeal. In an opinion written
by Justice McDonald, the court allowed the belated appeal, asserting that it
was not deciding the case on precedent but rather "on the significant policy
interest in ensuring that a parent and child are not separated without a
thorough review of the merits of the case."54 In E.H., the mother's lawyer
had filed a notice of appeal one day after the deadline for filing appeals.
The district court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.55
The Florida Supreme Court reasoned that Florida has a strong public
policy of protecting parent/child relationships, that termination of parental
rights permanently severs the relationship, and that the lawyer in the
particular case had been appointed to represent the parent at both the trial
and appellate levels.56 The court held that the mistake should not be
imputed to the mother when the consequence was the permanent loss of the
children. 7 The court concluded that there were extenuating circumstances
to allow the appeal. 8
The supreme court went to great lengths to justify the non-precedential
value of its opinion. Nevertheless, it appears to have failed. By recognizing
the significant public interest in allowing these appeals, it has set out a test
of "exceptionality" wherein belated appeals will be allowed. Finally, the
court ruled on the proper procedure for handling such appeals. 9 It ruled
that a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is the proper procedural vehicle
for seeking the appeal, and that the petition should be filed with the trial
court.6 0
In its second opinion on appellate practice in dependency cases,
Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services v. Honeycutt,61 the court
defined limitations on appeals from non-final orders. Honeycutt involved
an appeal by HRS from a trial court order in a dependency proceeding. The
trial court had denied a motion to extend the time of shelter placement,
53. 609 So. 2d 1289 (Fla. 1992).
54. Id. at 1291.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1290.
57. Id.
58. E.H., 609 So. 2d at 1290.
59. Id. at 1290-91.
60. Id.
61. 609 So. 2d 596 (Fla. 1992).
Dale
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pending the completion of the adjudicatory hearing.6" HRS argued to the
supreme court that a Chapter 39 child dependency proceeding falls within
the definition of domestic relations matters for purposes of appeals from
non-final orders under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(C)(i-
ii).63 The supreme court held that dependency proceedings under Chapter
39 do not fall within the traditional definition of domestic relations
matters.64 Although there is a concern for the expeditious resolution of
child placement issues, the court was unwilling to expand the definition of
domestic relations to include dependency proceedings. Oddly, it included
as part of its rationale the fact that to expand the definition would place a
severe burden on the case load of the district courts of appeal.63 This
failure to open the doors of the appellate courts seems somewhat inconsis-
tent given the supreme court's clear interest in protecting children in
substantive contexts.66
In In re T.M,67 the First District Court of Appeal ruled on the
question of what is a final order in a dependency proceeding. The father
had appealed from an adjudicatory order reaffirming a prior dependency
finding that had terminated his parental rights. He did not appeal from a
subsequent disposition order in the same case, which reaffirmed the
dependency adjudications and the termination of parental rights. The district
court rejected HRS' motion to dismiss the appeal. The court held that
orders in Chapter 39 proceedings do not always fit neatly into the traditional
categories of final and non-final orders.68 It held that the initial order of
reaffirmation of dependency and termination of parental rights was
sufficiently final on the question of the father's parental rights to be
appealable.69
62. Id.
63. Id. at 597. Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(C)(iii) states that
reviews from final orders may be heard if they involve the "right to immediate monetary
relief or child custody in domestic relations matters." FLA. R. App. P. 9.130(a)(3)(C)(iii).
64. Honeycutt, 609 So. 2d at 597.
65. Id.
66. See, e.g., A.A. v. Rolle, 604 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 1992); Padgett v. Department of
Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 577 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1991).
67. 614 So. 2d 561 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
68. Id.
69. Id.
[Vol. 18
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C. Child Abuse Reporting Issues
Section 415.504 of the Florida Statutes governs mandatory reporting of
abuse and neglect cases.70  The statute contains reporting requirements,
establishes a central abuse registry and tracking system, and provides for due
process protection for alleged perpetrators.71  Cases dealing with the
reporting system regularly come before the appellate courts. 2
In A.S. v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services,73 the appel-
late court reversed a final order of HRS denying a request to expunge an
individual's name from a confirmed report of child neglect. 74 The Second
District Court of Appeal determined that the facts agreed to by the parties
did not constitute child abuse or neglect as defined by section 415.503 of
the Florida Statutes." The court thus reversed on the facts. In dictum,
however, it raised the much more serious question of the constitutionality
of section 415.503(9)(e), which defines abuse or neglect for purposes of
reporting to include the situation where "the parent or other person responsi-
ble for the child's welfare; . . .(e) [f]ails to provide the child with super-
vision or guardianship by specific acts or omissions of a serious nature
requiring the intervention of the department or the court ....
The court was unable to determine what words like "serious nature" or
"requiring the intervention of the department or the court" mean.77
Similarly, the court stated that while it understood the term to mean more
than "mere investigation of reports," it was nonetheless vague because the
court was unable to determine what more was required. 78  Lacking any
definitive standards, the court would have held the statute unconstitutional
70. FLA. STAT. § 415.504 (1991); see generally Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1991
Survey of Florida Law, 16 NOVA L. REV. 333, 336-38 (1991).
71. See FLA. STAT. § 415.504(4) (1991).
72. For a discussion of cases decided in prior years, see Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law:
1991 Survey of Florida Law, 16 NOVA L. REV. 333, 366-68 (1991).
73. 616 So. 2d 1202 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
74. Id. at 1203.
75. Id. at 1207. Child abuse or neglect is defined by that section as, "[hiarm or
threatened harm to a child's physical or mental health or welfare by the acts or omissions of
a parent . I..." d. (citing FLA. STAT. § 415.503 (1991)).
76. Id. at 1206 (citing FLA. STAT. § 415.503(9)(e) (1991)).
77. A.S., 616 So. 2d at 1206.
78. Id.
Dale
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as against a challenge to its facial validity.79 Because the issue was not
raised, it reversed and remanded the case to the trial court.8"
III. DELINQUENCY
A. Detention Issues
Because substantial numbers of children are placed in secure detention
in Florida, significant issues of the conditions of confinement as well as
proper interpretation of the legislation related to detention arise."' Cases
involving detention regularly reach the appellate courts.82 In H.L. v.
Woolsey,83 for example, a juvenile filed a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus to challenge predispositional hearing detention on the grounds that
the child failed to meet detention criteria and that detention was not indicat-
ed by the risk assessment instrument as required by Florida Statutes, sections
39.044(2) and 39.044(3). The appellate court rejected the child's argument,
determining that sections 39.044(2) and 39.044(5)(c), provisions not relied
upon by the state, must be read to allow the trial court to detain a child for
a limited time after adjudication but before a dispositional hearing is
held. 4 Without any explanation, the court simply cited to language in
section 39.044(5)(c), which states:
No child shall be held in secure, nonsecure, or home detention care for
more than 15 days following the entry of an order of adjudication
79. Id
80. Id. at 1206-07. For more technical issues decided by the appellate courts this year,
see R.M. v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services, 617 So. 2d 810 (Fla. 5th Dist.
Ct. App. 1993) (holding that HRS must review the record of a hearing officer before
rejecting the officer's factual findings that support expunction of a child abuse report); E.V.
v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services, 615 So. 2d 251 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1993) (holding that an imprisoned parent who refuses to sign papers to have a child placed
in the care of a responsible adult because he legitimately questioned his paternity cannot be
found to have abandoned a child under section 415.503(9)(d)); Kelly v. Department of Health
& Rehabilitative Services, 610 So. 2d 1375 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that a
conviction of child abuse without more is not conclusive proof as a matter of law that the
alleged abuse actually took place).
81. See generally Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1992 Survey of Florida Law, 17 NOVA
L. REV. 335, 348-53 (1992).
82. See id; Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1991 Survey of Florida Law, 16 NOVA L.
REV. 333, 339-43 (1991); Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1990 Survey of Florida Law, 15
NOVA L REV. 1169, 1171-73 (1990).
83. 618 So. 2d 268 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
84. Id. at 269.
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unless an order of disposition pursuant to s. 39.054 has been entered by
the court or unless a continuance, which shall not exceed 15 days, has
been granted for cause. 5
Apparently, the appellate court was suggesting that the detention
criteria do not apply during the fifteen day period after adjudication and
before disposition. The court's argument seems to be that the earlier section
does not apply. However, both provisions are contained within the larger
sub-division entitled "Detention." More significantly, the grounds for
detention contain no limitation. The court's opinion is, therefore, lacking
an analytic foundation.
The issue of juvenile contempt continues to frustrate the Florida
juvenile courts in light of the supreme court's decision in A.A. v. Rolle, 6
in which the court limited the punishment for contempt by precluding secure
detention facilities as a place to hold children for contempt. In ML.B. v.
State, 7 the First District Court of Appeal held that a juvenile arraignment
citation does not constitute a court order for purposes of holding a child in
criminal contempt. The court concluded that the arraignment citation is not
the same as a notice to appear, which is issued pursuant to Rule 8.045 of the
Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure. 8 Because that document provides a
space for the child's signature and promise to appear in court at the
appointed time, it is thus enforceable. 9  Most significant to the court's
ruling was the fact that there was no order for the child to violate because
there was never any way to prove that the child received notice.9"
In a separate detention-related case, C.J. v. Rolle,9' a juvenile brought
a writ of habeas corpus claiming that he could not be held in detention
under the detention statute. The child had been charged with a second
degree felony while on release status after having been charged with a prior
second degree felony. Pursuant to section 39.044(2)(d)3 of the Florida
Statutes, a child may be held in secure detention when charged with a
second degree felony involving a violation of Chapter 893 (the charge in the
case at hand) and where he had already been detained or released and was
awaiting final disposition of his case.92 The crucial issue was the defini-
85. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 39.044(5)(c) (1991)).
86. 604 :So. 2d 813 (Fla. 1992).
87. 604 So. 2d 1257 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
88. Id. at 1259-60.
89. Id. at 1259.
90. Id. at 1260.
91. 608 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
92. Id. al. 118 (citing FLA. STAT. § 39.044(2)(d)(3) (1991)).
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tion of the word final disposition. The child argued that final disposition
meant a disposition hearing. The appellate court rejected this contention
indicating that final disposition meant from the time of being charged with
a crime to final disposition of the case.93 It therefore upheld the deten-
tion.94
The appellate frustration with the A.A. v. Rolle95 case is further
evidenced in T.R.A. v. State.96 In T.R.A., a child contemptuously told the
trial court judge to "screw off," whereupon the judge placed the child in
secure detention. Reluctantly relying on Rolle, the appellate court granted
the petition but referred to Justice Overton's dissent by suggesting that the
Legislature overrule the supreme court opinion in Rolle.97
B. Appellate Issues
The issue of the appealability of an order waiving juvenile jurisdiction
and certifying a juvenile for trial as an adult came before the Fourth District
Court of Appeal in In re D. W.9 The appellate court ruled that an order
of involuntary waiver by the trial court is not a final order from which an
appeal will lie.99 The court looked to the Florida Rules of Appellate
Procedure. Although a petition for a common law writ of certiorari was a
possibility, under the facts of the case, the court could find no essential
departure from the law, nor irreparable harm from that final order, and no
complete and adequate relief that would not result from the final order, so
as to allow the interim order to be otherwise appealable.' °
In State v. D. V.S.,' °' the state brought a petition for writ of certiorari
challenging the trial court's order that appointed the public defender to
represent a juvenile in an appeal from a delinquency disposition. The state
argued that the trial court had not obtained an affidavit of indigency from
the child's father. The trial court also failed to make a determination of
probable expense and burden of defending the case as required by Florida
Statutes sections 27.52 and 27.56. While the child and his mother filed
affidavits of insolvency, the father did not file one. Nor was there any
93. Id.
94. Id. at 118-19.
95. 604 So. 2d at 813.
96. 605 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
97. Id. at 552.
98. 616 So. 2d 620 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. 617 So. 2d 1162 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
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indication that he refused to furnish necessary legal services. Thus, on the
facts the appellate court reversed. °2
C. Dispositional Issues
The Florida Juvenile Justice Act,0 3 passed in 1990, provides a variety
of dispositional alternatives that contain elements of rehabilitation, deter-
rence, and punishment. The dispositional alternatives include commitment
to HRS and community control, which are known in most jurisdictions as
probation and restitution. Interpreting the powers of the trial court in the
dispositional context remains a focus for a substantial number of appellate
court rulings.
A question of First Amendment freedom of religion arose recently in
the second reported opinion in L.M v. State. 4 L.M involved an appeal
from a remand and subsequent decision by the trial court imposing a
condition of community control that required the child to obey all lawful
and reasonable demands of his mother including participation in church
youth programs. In a split decision, the majority first held that it was not
an improper delegation of judicial authority to L.M.'s mother to determine
which particular programs or activities the child must attend.0 5 The court
distinguished between complying with lawful demands of a probation officer
delegated with judicial authority and requiring a child to obey parental
directions.'0 6 The court added that if the mother's demands were not
lawful or were unreasonable, the matter could be decided when a dispute
arose between the mother and child resulting in a violation of the condi-
tion. 07
The court also concluded that the condition requiring participation in
church programs chosen by the parent did not violate the child's First
Amendment right of free exercise of religion.' The child argued that
this order directly violated the appellate court's prior holding in L.M v.
State."9  The court appeared to skirt this issue by indicating that the
102. Id. at 1164.
103. FLA. STAT. § 39.001(l) (1991).
104. 610 So. 2d 1314 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
105. Id. at 1317-18.
106. Id. at 1318.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1319.
109. L.M., 610 So. 2d at 1318. The prior holding in L.M. v. State held that an order
requiring a juvenile placed under community control to submit to a course of religious
instruction violates the First Amendment. L.M. v. State, 587 So. 2d 648, 649 (Fla. 1st Dist.
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extent to which a court can or should have authority to enforce parental
directions when the child refuses to obey, as in the case of religious training,
need not be decided because that issue was not yet present." ' The court
appeared to avoid this issue, indicating that the extent of its authority to
enforce parental directions is limited to when the child refuses to obey the
parental order. In the L.M v. State case, no violation had as yet oc-
curred."' Thus, the issue of whether the condition of religious training
was violative of the youth's constitutional rights was not before the court.
The court determined that such community control provisions are presump-
tively valid and that it may decide this issue when raised by the child in
response to a violation of the community control petition.'' 2 Judge Allen
dissented, finding that the court's ruling was a matter of a "game of
semantics to accomplish the very result which was disapproved in In re L.M
v. State."''3
Two other dispositional matters-restitution and specific written
findings-determining whether a child shall be treated as an adult or juvenile
for dispositional purposes, require brief analysis. Florida's provision for
restitution in juvenile delinquency cases has been the subject of substantial
appellate review based upon the generally inexplicable failure of the trial
courts to comply with the restitution requirements of Florida law." 4 For
example, in C.S. v. State,"5 the appellate court affirmed the adjudication
but vacated the restitution order on the grounds that the state had failed to
carry its burden of proving the amount of restitution." 6 The state neglect-
ed to present testimony of a witness with knowledge of the amount of
damages in repairs or to present uncontested documentary evidence. Under
Ct. App. 1991); see also Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1992 Survey of Florida Law, 17
NOVA L. REV. 335, 358 (1992).
110. L.M, 610 So. 2d at 1319.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. (Allen, J., dissenting). Interestingly, neither the majority nor the dissent raised
the issues discussed by the United States Supreme Court in both Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205 (1972) (the dissenting opinion by Justice Douglas specifically addresses childrens'
independent First Amendment rights to freedom of religion) and Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (which dealt with the child's independent
First Amendment constitutional rights to freedom of religion and speech).
114. See FLA.. STAT. § 39.052(3)(f) (1991); see also Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law:
1992 Survey of Florida Law, 17 NOVA L. REV. 335, 359-60 (1992) (discussing other
restitution cases).
115. 617 So. 2d 863 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
116. Id at 864.
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the facts of the case, the state attorney simply stood up and advised the
court of the amount involved. Incredibly, the trial court accepted this over
the defense's objection, but the appellate court vacated the order and
remanded for a new restitution hearing.' 17
In F.A. v. State,"8 the appellate court vacated the order because the
trial court ordered restitution and payment for services of the public
defender but failed to provide the appellant notice or an opportunity to be
heard." 9  The trial court also failed to make an inquiry as to the
appellant's ability to pay.
20
In In re EP.,2 ' the state's attorney conceded error when the trial
court ordered the appellant to pay $730 in restitution for losses caused by
a burglary for which the appellant was not charged.
22
In LAD. v. State, 23 the mother of the child appealed from an order
directing her to pay restitution in the event that the child failed to do so and
ordering her to pay attorney's fees for court appointed counsel. 24 The
state conceded that the victim's damages were caused by a collision with the
child's car and were not in any way attributable to the child's act of leaving
the scene of the accident for which the child had been charged. Thus, the
court vacated the portion of the order directing the mother to pay restitution.
Further, the court reversed the assessment of the attorney's fee lien because
the mother was not afforded prior notice, nor notice of the right to a hearing
to contest the amount.'25
Finally, in In re B.S, 126 the state again conceded. The appellate court
modified the trial court's order of restitution to provide that the children,
because they were presently unemployed, would be obligated to begin
paying restitution only upon obtaining earnings from employment that would
permit them to comply with the condition.'27
The inability of the trial courts to comply with state law is even more
evident in the context of the requirement that the trial court make specific
117. Id.
118. 616 So. 2d 1092 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
119. Id. at 1093.
120. Id.
121. 615 So. 2d 214 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
122. Id.
123. 616 So. 2d 106 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 624 So. 2d 268 (Fla.
1993).
124. Id at 107.
125. Id.
126. 616 So. 2d 1231 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
127. Id.
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written findings and reasons for the imposition of an adult sentence, as
opposed to a juvenile sentence, pursuant to Florida Statutes, section
39.059(7)(d). 2 8 Recent cases demonstrating the trial court's failure to do
just this include Mathews v. State,129 Kelly v. State,'3" Hill v. State,'
Trueblood v. State, 32 Petithomme v. State,'33 and Orange v. State.134
For years, this problem has reoccurred.
Similarly, trial courts regularly fail to determine whether there was a
knowing and intelligent waiver of the child's right to findings under section
39.059(7).' In the absence of such a knowing and intelligent waiver, it is
reversible error for the trial court to impose adult sanctions on the youngster
without making the required statutory findings.'36
The more difficult question is whether a child who enters a negotiated
plea agreement that allows the court to consider the imposition of adult or
juvenile sanctions necessarily waives his or her right to have the court make
findings and give reasons for the imposition of adult sanctions. The
supreme court held recently, in Pittman v. State, that without an intelligent
and knowing waiver that is "manifest on the record," a youngster who enters
a negotiated plea agreement does not waive any rights under section
39.111.1'7
IV. FAMILIES AND CHILDREN IN NEED OF SERVICES
Part IV of Chapter 39 of the Florida Statutes was passed in 1987 and
governs families in need of services and children in need of services. 3 '
Its purpose is to provide families "with an array of services designed to
128. See FLA. STAT. § 39.059(7)(d) (1991).
129. 614 So. 2d 1230 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
130. 605 So. 2d 990 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
131. 605 So. 2d 514 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
132. 610 So. 2d 14 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
133. 610 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
134. 619 So. 2d 1033 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
135. Rollins v. State, 610 So. 2d 651 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992); Pittman v. State,
620 So. 2d 1232 (Fla. 1993).
136. See Hill v. State, 596 So. 2d 1210, 1211 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (reversing
sentence for failure of record to reflect manifest waiver by juvenile or written findings of fact
to support adult sanctions).
137. Pittman, 620 So. 2d at 1232.
138. For a brief summary of the statutory provisions governing families and children in
need of services, see Michael J. Dale, Survey of Florida Law: Juvenile Law, 13 NOVA L.
REV. 1159, 1190-93 (1989).
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preserve the unity and the integrity of their family."1"9 Prior to this year
there had only been one reported opinion interpreting the statute since its
passage in 1987.140 This year, a second reported opinion interpreted the
statute.
In Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services v. Superintendent
of Schools for Seminole County,14 1 the state welfare department appealed
a trial court adjudication of a child in need of services, arguing that the
school board lacked standing to commence a child in need of services
proceeding. The school board had filed a petition alleging a second grader
was chronically truant. The court rejected HRS's argument and relied upon
Florida Statutes, section 232.19(3)(a), which provides that in the case of
habitual truancy, the school administration may file a child in need of
services complaint. 142 HRS argued that the 1987 changes in Chapter 39,
which created the child in need of services classification, preempted section
232(19)3.43 While recognizing that the coordination of the two laws "is
certainly no model of clarity,"', 44 the court held that the legislative intent
was to have section 232 continue to be in force since the Legislature revised
section 232 after the passage of the 1987 amendments to Chapter 39
governing children in need of services. 145
V. CONCLUSION
The appellate courts in Florida decided a number of important cases
during the survey period. While the Gregory K. case may be more
titillating to the public and the media than it is to practitioners, the
intermediate appellate court's decision nonetheless clarifies some important
procedural issues. In addition, the supreme court clarified some issues of
appellate practice this year and the lower appellate courts continued to
139. FLA. STAT. § 39.42(1) (1991).
140. See Wolf v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 588 So. 2d 335 (Fla.
5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991); see also, Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1992 Survey of Florida
Law, 17 NOVA L. REV. 336, 383-84 (1992) (discussing the Wolf case).
141. 618 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
142. Id. at 332-33. Section 232.19(3)(a) ofthe Florida Statutes provides in relevant part,
"[i]n case a child becomes a habitual truant the school administration shall file with the
circuit court a complaint alleging the facts and the child shall be dealt with as a child in need
of services .... FLA. STAT. § 232.19(3)(a) (1991).
143. Superintendent of Sch. for Seminole County, 618 So. 2d at 332.
144. Id. The decision is correct although the court's syntax isn't.
145. Id. at 332-33.
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carefully interpret Chapter 39 and hold the trial courts responsible for strict
compliance with the 1990 juvenile code.
20
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